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La metaphore ou la mktonymie? 
HelGne Cixous et la question d'essentialisme 
L'essentialisme: la question du m&mella mtme question. Les fkministes 
se trouvent duns une impasse: ou elles postulent une spkc8citk et se 
voient accuskes d 'essentialisme ou elles nient la diflkrence sexuelle et 
sont accuskes de se masculiniser. Hkline Cixous parle d'une kcriture au 
fkminin ou d'une kconomie libidinale oit les pulsions orientent le moi 
vers le monde. Dans la conjoncture historique actuelle, selon Cixous il 
faut employer les mots "masculine" et "fkminin," mais il faut 
reconnaitre qu'ils sont imbriquks dans un rkseau d'inscription cul- 
turelle. Socialisb et me'taphorisks, ses mots font signes et tissent des 
relations de (re)production. Tout comme Derrida, Cixous dkstabilise 
l'opposition binaire du propre et dufigurkdans le langage et la philoso- 
phie en exposant leur cornplicite'. 
Cixous pose la question li l'envers, selon Binhammer. Est-ce que le 
corps-signifurnt dans le discours sociale peut se dktacher du corps 
objet-concret? Dans I'oscillation entre les deux polarite's, la mktaphore 
maternelle fonction en tant quecatkchrise ou mktaphore mortepriseau 
sens propre du "dktournement d'un mot de son sens propre. " Si au lieu 
de lire leglissement du corps mktaphorique au corps littkral d partir de 
l'axe de substitution, d'identitk, on le lit ci partir de l'axe de combina- 
tion, de contiguitk (cesf-d-dire, de l'axe mktonymique), on dkplace 
l'opposition catkgorique oulou. La mktonymie ktant le trope qui se 
rklise uniquement dans une situation historique spkcifque dfin de 
complkfer le riseau signifant, Cixous pense la difkrence diffe'rament 
pour que "la femme" ne soit plus prisonniffe des oppositions 
catkgoriques. 
If we keep on speaking the same language together, we're going 
to reproduce the same history. Begin the same old stories all over 
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again. Don't you think so? Listen: all around us, men and 
women sound just the same. The same discussions, the same 
arguments, the same scenes. The same attractions and separa- 
tions. The same difficulties, the same impossibility of making 
connections. The same . . . Same . . . Always the same. - Luce Iri- 
garay 
The word 'woman' holds me captive. I would like to wear it out. 
- HelPne Cixous 
Feminist theoretical arguments around the issue of essentialism pro- 
duce endless repetitions of the Same - the same discussions, the same 
arguments, the same scenes. The scenario is well known: a particular 
theorist is accused of being "essentialist" and, consequently, her work 
is not attended to, she is silenced. I believe that the same discussions 
are repeated because we are entrapped by an eitherlor dialectic that, 
once inside, is impossible to escape. Either we posit a female specifi- 
city and are accused of essentialism, or we deny difference, demand 
equality and are accused of becoming men, like Maggie Thatcher. Per- 
haps this is what HClene Cixous meant when she declared "The word 
'woman' holds me captive" (1988,52). The issue of sexual diff erence is 
held captive by the Same, the refusal to think difference differently, in 
a way that does not endlessly repeat the eitherlor of essential- 
ismlnon-essentialism, that invites a new way of signifying 'woman' 
which will not invoke the same discussions, the same arguments, the 
same scenes. 
Partly, it is a problem of language, a problem of the signified and 
signifier 'woman.' What do we mean when we say woman? Female? 
Feminine?l Or, as Cixous asks in vivre l'orange, "How to call myself 
woman?" (38) How does the adjective of 'woman's' modify 'writing'? 
Cixous laments the violence of language, the violence of naming 
'woman': "I would like to live in a time in which language would not 
be bound, castrated, intimidated, obliged to obey the false scholars 
who are true ignoramuses" (1988,50). She warns against the sort of 
"forced truth" saying "I am a woman" might produce: "We are closed 
in, we enclose ourselves, we enwomen ["enfermme(r)"] our- 
selvesW(1988, 50). But Cixous' work is primarily about exploring the 
possibility of a feminine writing or a writing said to be feminine, of 
defining and enclosing masculine and feminine libidinal economies 
and for this she is accused of essentialism. Denying the possibility of 
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such explorations, though, equally encloses women, for a dogmatic 
anti-essentialist stance remains in the logic of the Same, a logic of dia- 
lectical difference. 
The reception of Cixous in ~nglo-American2 feminist circles exem- 
plifies the sameness evident in the essentialist question. Cixous has 
received a reputation in Anglo-American feminism as the major pro- 
ponent of "ecriture feminine," arising mainly out of the 1976 appear- 
ance in Signs of her programmatic essay "The Laugh of the Medusa." 
Anti-essentialist readings of the article are indicative of the paradox of 
naming woman: they are a symptom, like the essentialist question in 
general is a symptom, of the complex issue of the relation of signifiers 
to signifieds, of words to things. I say that the essentialist question is a 
symptom because I do not want to simply repeat the same pattern of 
monological accusations against anti-essentialists, it is not my pur- 
pose to critique TorilMoi, partly because1 do not feel like the critiques 
of the critiques get us anywhere, rather they remain in the dualism of 
taking sides and establishing oppositions. Cixous' reception by 
Anglo-American feminists indicates the problem of 'woman' in 
philosophical discourse in general, of the relationship between 
'woman' in language and the historical bodies of women. 
Anglo-American critiques of Cixous' conception of women's writ- 
ing revolves around the relationship of writing to women's bodies. In 
"Laugh of the Medusa" Cixous writes that "woman is never far from 
"mother" ... She writes in white ink" (881). Anti-essentialists read 
"white ink" literally, to signify "mother's milk," they interpret Cixous 
as suggesting a direct linkbetween breast feeding and writing written 
by biological females. The question of essentialism in Cixous is funda- 
mentally a question about "white i n k  or about what she means by 
"feminine" when she speaks of a feminine libidinal economy and its 
relation to females. Anti-essentialist critiques are based on a particu- 
lar reading of the relation of femininity to female which collapses the 
two into the same, which interprets Cixous as an anatomical deter- 
minist. Toril Moi, in Sexual/ Textual Politics accuses Cixous of instigat- 
ing the collapse. On the one hand, Moi reads her as positively anti- 
essentialist in her Derridean anti-biologism, and critique of binary 
logic, while, on the other hand, Moi asserts Cixous falls back into 
biologistic language. Cixous' biologism according to Moi is caused by 
a "slippage from 'feminine' to 'female' (or 'woman')" (113). Ann 
Rosalind Jones in "Writing the Body: Toward an Understanding of 
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l'Ecriture fkminine", like Moi, collapses the feminine to the female. 
When Cixous speaks of a feminine libidinal economy, Jones interprets 
this as signifying an innate female sexuality. Cixous reads Clarice 
Lispector as exemplifying libidinal economy, Jones interprets this as 
signifylng an innate female sexuality: 
[Cixous] celebrates the Brazilian writer Clarice Lispector for 
what she sees as peculiarly female attentiveness to objects, the 
ability to perceive and represent them in a nurturing rather than 
dominating way. She believes that his empathetic attentiveness, 
and the literary modes to which it gives rise, arise from libidinal 
rather than sociocultural sources (my emphasis, 365). 
Does Cixous read Clarice's female attentiveness to objects or is it Jones 
that misreads Cixous? Is Jones or Cixous the anatomical reductionist? 
Jones opposes a libidinal economy to the social construction of sexual- 
ity and reads libidinal economy as signifylng an essential female sex- 
uality but does Cixous do this? Should we read Cixous' feminine libi- 
dinal economy anatomically, through biology, that is to say literally as 
signifylng innate female sexuality? Or should we resist the reduction, 
the collapse? Is it possible to read 'feminine' metaphorically? The 
same question can be asked of other French feminists. For example, 
Luce Irigaray's article "When Our Lips Speak Together" has been cri- 
ticized along the same lines as Cixous' "white ink". Did Irigaray mean 
there is some esential link between women's anatomy and how they 
speak? Or was she simply using the metaphor of lips to signify a par- 
ticular kind of writing? 
That one cannot collapse feminine into female in Cixous' text is, at 
times, blatantly evident or else how is it possible that in Readings with 
Clarice Lispector, Martim, the male character in Apple in the Dark is 
more feminine than the female characters? Cixous writes, "Given the 
nature of his crime, one could think that Martim is a real man. In fact, 
everything is reversed. A close reading shows that he is the most femi- 
nine of all the characters" (69). In this passage the feminine is divorced 
from any relation to female and functions metaphorically, to signify 
particular characteristics that Martim has that the female characters 
do not. Cixous writes that "The generic term [i.e., male and female] is 
deceptive and the economies of giving, of exchange, of communica- 
tion do not correspond to the apparent sex" (77). Since there is no nec- 
essary relationship of females to a feminine libidinal economy we 
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need to explore the significance of a reading practice and conception 
of writing that is based on the notion of libidinal economies categor- 
ized by gender. This will help determine the relationship of female to 
feminine, a relationship, I argue, that is central to the essentialist 
quagmire. 
Cixous reads Clarice Lispector to work on a feminine libidinal 
economy she reads Clarice for the inscriptions of a different relation 
to the gift, to pleasure, to time, to the subject, and to writing. When 
asked in a 1982 interview with Verna Conley what she means by 'libi- 
dinal', Cixous responds that she uses it in a very precise Freudian 
manner. She defines it as "the movement of a pulsion toward an 
object" which allows us to know what in other times had been ana- 
lyzed as the treaty of passions"(l30). 'Libidinal' concerns psychic 
drives and the way one orients oneself towards the world, it inhabits 
the area traditionally understood as the realm of instincts. However 
dangerous it might be to talk about drives, instincts and passions, it is 
also important to speak about pleasure, about how women experi- 
ence pleasure because, unlike Lacan, Cixous believes women have 
something to say about their pleasure. Clarice certainly does: 
Aqua viva is the inscription of a certain kind of pleasure, of a 
pleasure that does not keep itself for itself. Generally one holds 
back one's pleasure: I am having pleasure, but I do not say it. 
This brings us back to the Lacanian predicament: woman has 
pleasure but does not know that she has pleasure; she is incap- 
able of saying it. Lacan keeps on saying that women have noth- 
ing to say about their pleasure. This is not true. Measure is all 
Aqun viva is talking about. (1990,15) 
Libidinal drives manifest themselves through specific economies. 
By 'economy' Cixous means "the effect of desire, of love" (1982,130). 
Aqua viva inscribes pleasure but it is a certain kind of pleasure, a plea- 
sure based on the economy of not keeping itself for itself, a pleasure 
not dependent on the proper, on property on presence. Clarice experi- 
ences pleasures, passions and drives but the way she inscribes these 
pleasures depends on different economies, the effect of desire on giv- 
ing, on exchange, on writing. Libidinal economy is not exclusively 
about sex, it is also about writing and reading. In reading for Clarice's 
libidinal economy Cixous discusses issues of narrative, time and sub- 
jectivity. For example, the fragmentary nature of Aqua viva signals a 
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specific libidinal economy to Cixous. Writing in fragments means 
writing without a narrative: "Given her libidinal economy, Clarice 
does not like narrative and all it entails in literature" (1990,14). The 
absence of a narrative signifies the non-linear nature of the text. Time 
is different in Clarice - beginings and births emerge everywhere: "As 
there is no story, one can start anywhere"; "There are onlybeginnings, 
hundreds of them" (1990, 15,17). The libidinal economy of Clarice's 
texts is defined by its fragmentary nature, its use of repetition and 
weblike structure, its excessive character or limitlessness and its "pos- 
itive lack". In order to distinguish between a libidinal economy that 
rejects narrative and one that inscribes linearity, for example, Cixous 
employs the qualifiers 'masculine' and 'feminine.' Excessiveness is on 
the side of femininity: "In Clarice, we have a magnificent logic, that of 
a feminine libidinal economy, of an overabundance, directed toward a 
question rarely pondered, but always a feminine question about the 
unexpected drama of pIeasure as excess" (1990,117). Excessiveness - 
that which cannot be contained, enclosed ("enfemme(r)"?), that 
which names without naming, that which is but is also always more - 
is feminine. Why? Certainly, women have traditionally been 
inscribed on the side of excess as the unrepresentable "dark conti- 
nent" that exceeds understanding. But given this philosophical bag- 
gage, why use masculine and feminine and not white and black or 
positive and negative? Why use gender qualifiers when they only 
introduce an overwhelming history of orienting the world around 
what is for men and what is not? What do masculine and feminine 
libidinal economies have to do with males and females? Confusion 
and chaos are introduced, leading to Jones' reading of feminine libidi- 
nal economy as innate female sexuality. 
Cixous is often asked in interviews to clarify the confusion, to 
speak about her use of feminine and its relation to women's bodies, a 
relationship that, as shown with Martim, is not one of simple identity. 
Conley writes, "For Cixous, the terms "masculine" and "feminine" do 
not refer to "man" and "woman" in an exclusive way" (9). In her inter- 
view with Conley, Cixous discusses the relation as a problem of lan- 
guage and history: 
First of all, words like "masculine" and "feminine" that circulate 
everywhere and that are completely distorted by everyday 
usage, - words which refer, of course, to a classical vision of 
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sexual opposition between men and women - are our burden, 
that is what burdens us. As I often said, my work in fact aims at 
getting rid of words like "feminine" and "masculine," " feminin- 
ity" and "masculinity" even "man" and "woman," which desig- 
nate that which cannot be classified inside a signifier except by 
force and violence and which goes beyond it in any case. So it is 
true that when one says "feminine writing," one could almost 
thinkin terms of graphology.. . . Instead of saying feminine writ- 
ing or masculine writing, I ended up by saying writing said to be 
feminine or masculine, in order to mark the distance. In my sem- 
inar, rather than taking this elementary precaution, I speak of a 
decipherable libidinal femininity which can be read in a writing 
produced by a male or a female (1982,129). 
In her reading of texts Cixous deciphers two libidinal economies 
which need to be distinguished and the major ordering categories in 
Western thought are feminine and masculine. In employing the 
gender qualifiers, Cixous participates in history: "it is a question here 
of our whole history, or our whole culture, true, it would be nice if one 
could use, instead of masculine and feminine, color adjectives, for 
example" (1982,130). But Cixous does not believe one can use such 
unproblematical adjectives, we live in history and sexual opposition 
is a defining characteristic of our historical and social position. She 
states that she does not use the terms masculine and feminine in her 
seminar but publicly, and for political reasons she does: "Publicly, I 
must constantly have recourse to them, because we are in history, we 
live in history, we are in a historical political situation which we must 
take into account .... We must take into account the fact that we are 
caught in a daily reality in the stories of men and women, in the stories 
of a role" (1982, 133). Femininity and masculinity, in this passage 
relate however tangentially, to men and women - question, of course, 
is what is the status of this relationship? How does "daily reality" 
overdetermine masculine and feminine? Is it a relation of metaphor? 
In "Sorties," Cixous discusses the metaphorization of masculinity 
and femininity in history, the false attribution of qualities to men and 
women and the production of a whole sign system which aligns 
Woman with passivity, the moon, Nature, night, etc. (63). She writes: 
The (political) economy of the masculine and the feminine is 
organized by different demands and constraints, which as they 
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become socialized and metaphorized, produce signs, relations 
of power, relationships of production and reproduction, a whole 
huge system of cultural inscription that is legible as masculine 
or feminine. (1986,80) 
By using feminine and masculine to qualify libidinal economy Cixous 
participates in their metaphorization which is to say that she is read- 
ing cultural inscriptions rather than anatomical bodies. Realizing that 
femininity can never be divorced from its signifying chain, Cixous 
does not mean it narrowly and literally to refer to biological females. 
But once Cixous has displaced the feminine from the female, what 
becomes of those bodies? If we displace the term from the literal 
referent, how does the metaphor function? 
The presence of metaphor in philosophy is an issue current in the 
French intellectual scene. Derrida, in "White Mythologies" and Iri- 
garay in Speculum of the Other Woman both discuss the philosophical 
concern with figurative language and the traditional desire to divorce 
truth from metaphor. Derrida argues that while philosophical dis- 
course asserts a truth outside metaphor, and attempts to resist any 
contamination of figurative language, it cannot do so: philosophy can 
never escape the metaphysical concept of metaphor. The general 
economy of metaphor is an economy of usure, of loss, "it will never 
make a profit" because even if one sought to circumscribe all meta- 
phors in philosophy "one metaphor, at least, always would remain 
excluded, outside the system.. . the metaphor of metaphor" (219-220). 
Irigaray showed a similar economy at work in Plato. While Plato 
argues against metaphor as a bad copy of the Ideal, the mode of his 
argument consists, itself, of metaphors, specifically the metaphor of 
the cave/womb/woman. For both Irigaray and Derrida, the issue is 
philosophy's relation to language and the impossibility of divorcing 
the figurative from the literal or truth from metaphor. In looking at the 
relation of feminine to female in Cixous as one of metaphor, I am 
wondering if Denida's and Irigaray's argument does not work back- 
wards? That is to say, can the literal be divorced from the figurative? Is 
it possible to empty out all meaning from feminine that relates to the 
referent of female bodies? Like the very way in which the metaphor of 
the cave contaminates Plato's argument against representation, does 
the referent of the female body contaminate Cixous' metaphor? 
In speaking about Clarice's feminine libidinal economy the meta- 
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phor of birth plays a central role for Cixous. She writes, "the question 
of birth is an intensification, a metaphorization of a situation that is 
read as painful. It is determining for her and recurs as one of the 
themes of her writing" (1990,39). Diane Griffen Crowder reads Cix- 
ous' use of maternal metaphors as indicative of her slippage into 
biologism. Crowder states: 
Despite occasional disclaimers, Cixous views motherhood as a 
primary trait of women, as we shall see. But is maternity a meta- 
phor or a biological act for Cixous? A hesitation between meta- 
phor and reality, the symbolic and the lived, permeates her writ- 
ings .... Cixous' theory of "woman's writing" is based upon a 
vacillation between the body as concrete object and the body as a 
signifier in the social discourse of the unconscious. (132) 
It becomes evident in readinga wide range of Cixous' work that there 
is a vacillation - anatomical bodies invade the space of metaphor. The 
movement from the maternal metaphor to literal maternity corre- 
sponds to the trope of dead metaphor in which the metaphoric ren- 
dering of the word turns into a literal expression. In a dead metaphor, 
the originary figurative use is forgotten and "leg of the table" is 
understood as a literal signification. In a 1986 interview Cixous 
speaks about the maternal metaphor in the following way: 
I could write a thesis on the theme of giving birth in texts by 
women, it would be fascinating, It's a metaphor which comes 
easily to women, dictated by their experience. It's a metaphor 
Clarice Lispector uses, it's a metaphor I use. During childbirth a 
discovery is made inside the body. We can transpose the discov- 
ery, using it to understand moments in life which are analogous. 
A man will understand different things differently. Their bodies 
are sources of totally different images, transformations, expres- 
sions (1988,151). 
The metaphor deadens in Cixous when anatomical difference effects 
experience, for example, women's experience of childbirth or the way 
the two sexes make love. Women form analogies between experience 
biologically exclusive to them and a fictional theme, therefore, a femi- 
nine libidinal economy in this case (i.e., Clarice's birth thematic) is 
necessarily related to writing by biological females. That biological 
differences do effect the way a person writes is clear in the following 
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statement by Cixous: "I don't believe a man and woman are identical. 
Our differences have to do with the way we experience pleasure, with 
our bodily experiences, which are not the same. Our different experi- 
ences necessarily leave different marks, different memories . . . And 
these are transmitted through the text" (1988, 150). Following from 
these statements, it seems impossible to interpret Cixous' reading of 
the feminine libidinal economy of Clarice's text, its use of birth meta- 
phors, within the realm of active or live metaphor. The relationship of 
feminine to female in these passages is not simply figurative and met- 
aphorical. But on the other hand, given what Cixous has said about 
the femininity of Martim, it is neither a purely literal relation in which 
biology overdetermines language. 
Interestingly, in exploring the relation of literal to figurative in Cix- 
ous, of bodies to text, of feminine to female, I was led from the terri- 
tory of metaphor into that of metonymy. Cixous comes back to meta- 
phor and metonymy quite often in Reading with Clarice Lispecfor and 
what she says about them, how she figures them in her own text, is tel- 
ling. In discussing Clarice's use of non-identical repetition, repetition 
with a difference, Cixous invokes metaphor: 
I am still in metaphors; I do not fear them; I am obedient to what 
this text suggests. The text is metaphor itself, a metaphor that is 
not a metaphor but aqua viva, living water, an ongoing, gigantic 
metaphor, a facsimile of a book, which permanently works with 
a countermetaphor "with (17). 
The notion that something can be a metaphor and not a metaphor at 
the same time is repeated later by Cixous. In describing a feminine 
libidinal economy in terms of fluid, she writes, "the miracle of the 
fluid that Clarice gets across is neither metaphor nor nonmeta- 
phor" (77). Fluid, living water is central to the metaphor which is not a 
metaphor. It seems to me that something that is along the lines of liv- 
ing water, that is ongoing, fluid, functioning with 'with,' is within the 
territory of metonymy. Perhaps in thinking about the relationship of 
feminine to female we need to think along the lines of a metaphor that 
is not a metaphor, that is closer to a metonymy. 
The metonymic field is based on contiguity and combination 
rather that on identity and similarity. This difference allows us to 
escape the either/or established by traditional articulations of the 
essentialist problem - i.e., either one reads the relation of feminine to 
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female literally, therefore, biologistically and anatomically, or one 
reads it metaphorically and thus havingno relation to women. Anglo- 
American suspicion of the political ineffectiveness of French femi- 
nism is rooted in the latter formulation, that is to say, if the feminine is 
only a metaphor and Martim, Joyce or Genet can be better women 
than women, what could be the political usefulness of such a theory 
for the material conditions of women? To think of the relation as one 
of contiguity allows for the introduction of material considerations 
while avoiding essentialist definitions of women. When asked about 
why she returns to the use of feminine and masculine Cixous gives the 
following answers, in which the metonymic or contiguous relation is 
described: 
That is why I come back to the question of the terms masculine 
and feminine . . . . Because in spite of everything and for histori- 
cal reasons, the economy said to be feminine - which would be 
characterized by features, by traits, that are more adventurous, 
more on the side of spending, riskier, on the side of the body - is 
more livable in women than in men. Why? Because it is an econ- 
omy which is socially dangerous in our times (1982,133). 
When I qualify this libidinal economy by masculine or feminine, 
I do it with ten thousand precautions, because the words I use 
are deceptive. They are easy to use; they are facile current words. 
We should do without them, but we still use them. A feminine 
economy does not refer to women, but perhaps to a trait that 
comes back to women more often (1990,156). 
Feminine does not mean female but that is not to say there is no rela- 
tion at all -it is a metaphor and also not a metaphor, a metonymy. Cer- 
tain traits, certain characteristics are displayed by women, actual 
females, more often than men, and if you went along a continuous 
field you would find female arising more often than male. Feminine is 
not identical but contiguous with female. In criticizing Cixous' use of 
the maternal metaphor, Domna Stanton posits metonymy as a way of 
conceptualizing the maternal that avoids the identity and sameness 
implied by metaphor. While I disagree with Stanton's interpretation 
of the function of the maternal metaphor in Cixous, her suggestions 
regarding metonymy are useful. She describes metonymy as the trope 
that depends on history and, as such, must be understood materially. 
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Metonymy, to Stanton, is "the trope that cannot be defined," which 
means that the combinatory chain relating the two terms to each other 
must be determined within a specific historical and social context. 
Thus, the contiguity established between feminine and female is not 
essentialist, rather, it is historically specific. The problem I have with 
Stanton's reading of Cixous stems from the opposition she creates 
between her positive metonymic understanding of the maternal and 
what she sees as Cixous' negative and transcendental metaphoric ren- 
dering. The opposition between metaphor and metonymy, in this 
case, results in Stanton's dismissal of any meaningful insight possible 
from Cixous and it is an opposition that I do not think Cixous' texts 
establish. 
In defining the metaphor that is not a metaphor as a metonymy, the 
traditional opposition of metaphor and metonymy is displaced. Thus, 
it must be noted that when I say the relation of femininity to female is 
one of metonymy, I do not mean to oppose it completely to metaphor. 
This is what traditional scholarship on metaphor and metonymy 
does. The conventional, binary dualism of the two tropes is informed 
by Roman Jakobson's groundbreaking work on aphasics in which he 
describes metaphor and metonymy as polar opposites, the former 
relating to the faculty of sustitution and selection and the latter relat- 
ing to contiguity and combination. Jacques Lacan upholds the polar 
opposition of metaphor and metonymy in "The agency of the letter, in 
the unconscious or reason since Freud." Lacan reworks Jakobson's 
distinction, inscribing it in psychoanalytic terms - the field of meta- 
phor corresponds to the Freudian concept of condensation and 
metonymy is identified with displacement. 
In saying the relation of feminine to female is one of metonymy, I 
am not opposing it to metaphor, rather, I believe Cixous subsumes the 
two, insofar as the metaphor that is not a metaphor is a metonymy. 
The project of thinking non-oppositionally informs Cixous' work on 
sexual difference. Realizing that the language of presence is the only 
language present, she avails herself of masculine and feminine: 
Because we are born into language, and I cannot do otherwise 
than to find myself before words, we cannot get rid of them, they 
are there. We could change them, we could put signs in their 
place, but they would become just as closed, just as immobile 
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and petrifying as the words 'masculine' and 'feminine' and 
would lay down the law to us. So there is nothing to be done, 
except to shake them like apple trees, all the time (1988,15). 
Cixous constantly shakes the apple trees. She dreams of the day when 
we no longer need to use the terms masculine and feminine or man 
and woman, when those terms no longer carry any significance. This 
will only happen when the logic of Hegelian difference is no longer 
posited, when we think difference differentially, non-oppositionally - 
"No longer would the common logic of difference by organized with 
the opposition that remains dominant. Difference would be a bunch 
of new differences" (1986, 83). Part of the project of thinking differ- 
ence differently is functioning in the feminine libidinal economy that 
Cixous reads in Kleist, Joyce or Wordsworth. In not collapsing the 
feminine into female Cixous explores a theory of bisexuality that 
undermines stable sex oppositions. 
Traditional, patriarchal, conceptions of sexual difference presup- 
pose a stable, concrete difference between men and women. Cixous' 
theory of bisexuality inscribes a difference that is not a difference 
between men and women but difference within them: "All human 
beings are originally bisexual" (1982, 131). Cixous' conception of 
bisexuality is not one in which difierence is erased, neutralizied by 
positing a subject constituted by two halves, two sexes making one, 
single whole. Rather, she articulates an "other bisexuality," "that is to 
say the location within oneself of the presence of both sexes, evident 
and insistent in different ways according to the individual, the nonex- 
clusion of difference or of a sex" (1986,85). Thus, different drives, dif- 
ferent libidinal economies are present in both sexes. She does not deny 
that these economies are overdetermined by social and cultural signi- 
fying systems which produce different relations of historical, sexed 
subjects to libidinal economies but, by positing.bisexuality, Cixous is 
able to open up the possibility of an elsewhere in which sexual differ- 
ence will no longer exist in its present form ("It is impossible to predict 
what will become of sexual difference in another time (in two or three 
hundred years" ?") (1986, 83). In such a future, when males and 
females explore the infinite possibilities of their bisexuality, in this 
world of elsewhere, 'woman' will no longer hold us captive, and the 
either/or of essentialism will be worn out. 
78 . Tessera 
Notes 
l. In the American context it is easy to distinguish 'female' from 'feminine' in 
terms of sex and gender, the former denoting anatomy and the latter 
determined by social contructions. The question within the French context 
concerns 'woman'. Simone de Beauvoir defined 'woman' as a social 
construction, whereas, I think, AngleAmericans are more likely to read 
'woman' in terms of biological sex. My essay is really about this confusion (a 
confusion introduced through translation for the triad of female, feminine 
and woman is not active in French in the same way that it is in English) and 
thus when I use 'woman' I mean both and neither senses at the same time. 
2. I am using "Anglo-American" here to sigrufy a group of theorists who have 
come to stand for a particular anti-essentialist argument, although I realize 
that the whole of AngleAmerican feminism is in no way represented. 
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